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The term, commercial instruments, is used in this discussion to
include all bills of exchange, promissory notes and other like instru-
ments falling within the custom of merchants. It is purposed to
examine the decisions as to the commercial status of certain types of
bills and notes. Their importance is apparent when there are recalled
some of the special attributes of commercial instruments. At least
historically, only a- commercial instrument could become transferable
so as to vest legal title in a trapsferee if words of negotiability were
added.1 Only such an instrument may be so transferred as to free
its holder from various defences. Commercial instruments are sub-
ject to special rules of pleading and proof. To them the whole law
of diligence in presentment and.notice of dishonor applies. They are
often the subject of special legislative provisions concerning limitation
of actions, taxation and the lik9 .
The prime purpose of this discussion is to consider what is meant
by money in the law of bills and notes. It is convenient and desirable
to consider also certain closely related .questions. Since the Negotiable
Instruments Law has been adopted in all of the states except Georgia,
it will be well to clear the ground of kindred questions which will be
excluded from the discussion by reference to the pertinent section of
that act. Section i provides that,
"An instrument to be negotiable must . . . contain an uncondi-
tional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money."
This discussion will be limited to a consideration of the meaning of,
"to pay" and, "in money." The following distinct questions arising
under the provision just quoted will, therefore, be excluded:
(a) When does an instrument contain an order or promise within
the meaning of this section? One of the questions to be considered
here is raised by granting that a particular instrument contains an
order or a promise to do some act and then asking whether the act
ordered or promised is the act of paying.
(b) Is the order or promise unconditional? Excluding this ques-
tion excludes also the collateral question as to what is meant by an
order or promise to pay out of a particular fund which is covered by
the provisions of section 3 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
(c) Is the sum ordered to be paid or promised certain?
1 Whether this distinction has mire than historical importance is not considered.
[6o6]
MONEY IN COMMERCIAL INSTRUMENTS
THE MEANING OF "#TO PAY"
The question as to the meaning of "to pay" as here limited is quite
narrow. Accordingly, but few cases have involved it and they may be
disposed of briefly. They are cases where the instruments in ques-
tion contain forms of such verbs as "to account," "to credit," and
"to settle" instead of "to pay" following the words of promise or
order. Are such instruments commercial?
In an instrument reading, "I promise to account to P for $ioo,"
or " . . . to be accountable . . . ," the usual meaning of the
infinitive is, "We will state accounts." If there is no sufficient reason
for giving the words any meaning other than their usual one, such an
order or promise is not a bill or note2 since the promise may be per-
formed without its maker handing over any money. He may merely
credit the promisee with the amount named. If words of negotiability
are added, it is otherwise.3 As was pointed out in the first case on
the subject, 4 there is no probability of any and all possible transferees
of the instrument being indebted to the maker or drawee so as to
make a statement of accounts possible. It is proper to conclude that
in such a case the expression is used in an unusual sense, viz., "to
pay." The same rule is properly applied where the expression used
is "to settle."5  Where, however, there is an order or promise "to
credit," it would seem that the words should be given their usual
meaning, although words of negotiability are present. While it may
be improbable that any and all transferees will be indebted to the
drawee or maker so as to make a statement of accounts or a.settlement
possible, it will be possible for the drawee or maker to enter a credit
in favor of any transferee whether such credit is in payment of a debt
or not. Since it does not appear from the face of such an instrument
that money is necessarily to be handed over, it is not a commercial
instrument.6 Adding to an order to credit P or order the words "in
cash" makes the order a bill of exchange7 as the obvious meaning of
"to credit" is now the unusual one, to pay. It is believed the same is
the proper construction of the language although words of negotia-
bility are not present.3
Considering the number of cases involving it, the question is not
important," but, in studying the cases on whether or not an instru-
'Horne v. Redfearn (1838) 4 New Cas. 438; White v. North (z849) 3 Exch.
689; Carey v. Eccleston (834) x Cr. & D. Abr. Cas. 6; Pirie v. Smith (1833)
i Ross Lead. Cas. 56, XI Sess. Cas. 473.
'Morris v. Lee (1725) I Strange, 629. 'Ibid.
I Barker v. Seaman (i875) 6i N. Y. 648.
'Woolley v. Sergeant (1826, N. J.) 3 Halst. L. 262.
',llison v. Collingridge (i85o) 9 C. B. 570; Allen v. Fire & Life Assurance
Co. (185o) 9 C. B. 574.
"See Regina v. Gilchrist (I84I) Car. & M. 224.
'No other cases dealing with this question have been found.
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ment contains a promise or order, it is helpful to distinguish the two
questions, which is not commonly done.
WHAT IS MONEY?
Coming now to the main question to be considered, it may be stated
thus: Is an instrument rendered non-commercial by the fact that, by
its terms, the thing to be handed over in payment of it is not legal
tender although it is a medium passing current in exchange and is
considered to be money by the business world? Examples are bills
and notes payable in gold or silver certificates, national bank notes,
or federal reserve notes. Are they payable in money?
In considering the question, what is money for the purposes of
commercial paper, there can be left out of view instruments payable
in property in no sense approximating money such as "in good mer-
chantable whiskey."'1 These instruments were not and are not within
the custom of merchants as they are generally acceptable, and hence
useful, only in communities but one step removed from a barter
economy.1 There will be considered later instruments payable in
property which in particular communities is used as a medium of
exchange.
An examination of the cases1 2 shows that most of the courts have
adopted the theory that nothing is money for the purposes of
negotiable instruments unless it is legal tender although, by what is
in most cases an unwarrantable construction of the language used,
many of the courts taking this view- reach the practical result that
instruments expressed to be payable in de facto money are none the
less commercial instruments. Most of the recent text-writers also
take the view that money is confined to what is tenderable for debt.
Some are quoted in the foot note.13 Few of them discuss the question
"Rhodes v. Lindley (1827) 3 Oh. 51 and cases collected in 8 C. J. 130.
'The financial structure of society during the early part of the last century
in some of the newer states led to statutes giving various attributes of com-
mercial paper to instruments payable in property generally. Alabama: Toulmin's
Digest, 69, act approved 1812; Georgia: Code, sec. 427o, act approved 1799;
Illinois: Rev. St. 1845, ch. 63, act approved 1845; Iowa: Rev. St. 1843, ch. io6,
act approved 1843; Mississippi: Hutchinson's Code, 64o, act approved 1822;
Missouri: Rev. St. 1845, ch. 21, act approved 1835. The Illinois statute is still in
force as to notes payable in things other than money since, by sec. i, the nego-
tiable instruments law as adopted in Illinois is limited to instruments payable in
money. The negotiable instrument law not having been adopted in Georgia,
the statute of 1799 is still in force.
"See notes 21-24, infra.
""A bill must be payable in money, i. e., in what is a legal tender in payment
of debts at the place of payment." 2 Ames, Cases on Bills and Notes (1894)
828.
"The bill cannot be made payable in the money of any country whatever.
It must be payable in legal tender of the place where it is made payable. . .
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critically. It is noteworthy that no such idea is to be found in the
early writers on bills and notes.
Using the word, money, in the broadest sense, the following attributes
of the things included thereunder may be distinguished:
(i) By legislation some kinds of money are made legal tender of
payment of some or all kinds of debt.1 4  The effects of this attribute
are that, if such money is tendered by a debtor in strict compliance
with all the numerous and exacting requirements of a proper tender
and the tender is refused, interest as an element of damages ceases to
accumulate, the creditor may not thereafter in an action to collect the
debt recover his costs, parties secondarily liable are discharged and
securities on property are lost.15
(2) Not by governmental fiat but because of the necessities of
trade there are in existence common media of exchange, which are
sometimes and in some places quite conventional and at other times
and in other places quite the reverse. Gold dust in mining communi-
but in so far as they [statements by Chitty and Story] or the cases founded
upon them, or upon which they are founded, embody the proposition that a
good promissory note can be made, the obligation of which can be discharged
by the tender of that which is not legal tender at the place of payment, they are
unsound in principle and in conflict with the requirement that the note should be
payable in money." Russell, Bills, 56.
"Bills and notes, being representatives of money, must be payable in money.
'Money', within this rule, means whatever may be used as legal tender for pay-
ment of debts at the place where the bill or note is payable." Norton, Bills
and Notes (4th ed. xz94) 6i. "By 'money' is meant, in strictness, that which
by law is tenderable for debt, that is, assuming that no provision is made for
payment in anything else. If the instrument is not payable in money, or in
what the courts judicially know to be equivalent to money, it is not an instrument
of the law merchant. . . . The difficulty lies in what is to be accepted as
judicially known to be equivalent to money. It is hardly safe to call anything
the equivalent of money on the ground that it passes as such at certain
places; . . . Nor is it safe to treat currency, unless it is the currency of
the nation, as equivalent to money; for currency is apt to fluctuate, that is, to
fall from its face value. The most, it seems, that the law should allow would
be a promise to pay in current money of a 'particular kind."' Bigelow, Bills,
Notes and Cheques (2d ed. igoo) 27, 28. It is not entirely clear just what
position this quotation represents.
4 In the United States legal tender is limited to: (a) gold coin and the silver
dollar for any amount; (b) the subsidiary silver coins for not over ten
dollars; (c) the minor coins for not over twenty-five cents; (d) United States
notes for any amount and for all debts except duties on imports and
interest on the public debt. U. S. Comp. St. secs. 6571-6575. Federal reserve
notes are at most legal tender only to member banks and in payment of taxes,
customs and public dues. U. S. Comp. St. sec. 9799. National bank notes and
gold and silver certificates are not legal tender. The Vreeland currency was
not, and treasury notes are not now, legal tender.
38 Cyc. 162, 163; N. I. L. secs. i2o-4. These legal consequences are doctrines
of the law antedating legal tender legislation and in application are not con-
terminous therewith.
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ties, skins among trappers, and the American dollar in parts of
Mexico and Canada serve this function as truly as does any form of
money anywhere. The utility of a particular thing as a medium of
exchange in a given locality is measured by the degree to which it
approaches universal acceptability in exchange in the area in question.
The test here is how readily receivable it is.
(3) Mensuration of gravity and space is no more convenient and
necessary than is -the ability to express in common units the power of
articles in exchange. Doubly convenient is a value yardstick that is
also one of the things exchanged. The practice of having a common
denominator of value and of making the medium of exchange serve
this purpose also is followed wherever governmental monetary systems
prevail and is of incalculable utility.
(4) When men bartered only and did not sell on credit or lend
they got just what was due them. When they began to exchange
property for tokens they did not, unless the future exchange power
of the tokens was constant. Credit necessitates a standard of deferred
payments, which some forms of money are with varying success.
(5) The things used for any or all of the foregoing purposes may
have and often do have intrinsic value. In early times they usually
did, now they less and less frequently do. Many factors, some physical
and some psychological, put gold in this class. Money possessing this
quality may have a commodity value independent, within limits, of its
exchange value or purchasing power.
That these attributes and functions are practically distinguishable
is shown by the following considerations. Legal tender is not always
current. The price of gold has, at times, driven gold coins out of
circulation. It would be awkward but not impossible to make a thing
legal tender which was not denominative.1" Our "greenbacks,"
though legal tender, failed to function satisfactorily as a standard
of deferred payments and they possess no intrinsic value comparable
with their nominal value. The greater part of our medium of exchange
is not legal tender and has no intrinsic value. Once gold dust in
Alaska and pelts on the Mississippi were generally acceptable in
exchanges in which the calculation was done in terms of dollars and
cents. Many contend that a system much more desirable than our
present one would be a scheme making the standard of deferred pay-
ments a group of commodities distinct from the things we use as
money in any other sense.
In considering which of the foregoing qualities is definitive of money
for the purposes of bills and notes, the choice lies between the first two.
There has been no contention whether things not common denominators
of value are money. So, too, as to the use of money to fix the obliga-
tion of a contract of payment.1 7 Wilson, J., in Gray v. Worden
" Breckinridge, Legal Tender (1912) 53, 54.
'1Questions relating to the standard of deferred payments are considered
infra.
MONEY IN COMMERCIAL INSTRUMENTS
announced the novel doctrine that a promise to pay a sum in CanadIa
bills which were legal tender at the place of payment was not a note
because not payable in money. He said:
"Canada bills . . . are not money or specie. They have no
intrinsic value as coin has. They represent only, and are the signs of,
value. 'Money itself is a commodity: it is not a sign; it is the thing
signified.' ""s
The uniqueness of this decision is not likely to be disturbed.19
Almost all the questions arising in this field resolve themselves into,
whether an instrument, otherwise a bill or note, payable in a thing
possessing the attribute of being current and not that of legal tender
is payable in money. This question is raised in two ways. The
instrument may be expressly payable in such a thing, e. g., "payable
in National Bank Notes,' 20 or it may be expressed as payable in
"currency," "current funds," "Tennessee money" and the like. Upon
the question so raised there was a marked division of opinion in the
United States prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law. Some courts
took the position that money is not limited to legal tender but includes
also the de facto media of exchange, holding both types of instruments
good.21 More courts, starting with the assumption that money is
18 (1870) 29 U. C. Q. B. 535.
Of this case Russell says: "For this view -f the matter McCullock's
Political Economy is cited; but a more appropriate source of authority for the
determination of a legal question would be Lord Mansfield who said in Miller
v. Race, 1758, 1 Burr. 452: 'These notes are not like bills of exchange, mere
securities or documents for debts, nor are they so esteemed, but are treated as
money in the ordinary course and transaction of business by the general sense
of mankind, and on payment of them when a receipt is required the receipts
are always given as' for money and not for securities." Russell op. cit., 54.
But Mr. Russell does not accept Lord Mansfield's definition of money here
quoted. See note 13; supra. "The opinion expressed (in Gray v., Worden) that
legal tender notes are not money, however sound in political economy, is unsound
in law." 2 Ames, op. cit., 829. It is unsound in political economy and is neither
good law nor good sense. The difference between a silver dollar and a one
dollar silver certificate is, indeed, for most practical purposes less important
than the difference between a silver dollar and a gold dollar. Within limits,
the exchange values of both the silver dollar and the silver certificate are wholly
independent of their intrinsic or commodity value while, by definition of starldard,
the -exchange value and commodity value of the gold dollar are the same thing.
"Pardee v. Fish (1875) 6o N. Y. 265.
" Cases of instruments in terms payable in what was not legal tender being
held good are extremely rare. Pardee v. Fish, supra, is such in view of the
effect of 12 Stat. L. 709; 13 Stat. L. 484; 14 Stat. L. 146; I5 Stat. L. 6, and
Veazie Bank v. Fenno (1869, U. S.) 8 Wall. 533. See also Deason v. Taylor
(1876) 53 Miss. 697; cf. Mississippi cases cited in note 23, infra. In the follow-
ing cases the instruments were expressed to be payable in currency and the like.
This was held not to affect their commercial character: Swift v. Whitney
(1858) 20 II. 144 ("They might, undoubtedly, have been negotiated under our
statute, if not by the law merchant) ; Kupfer v. Marc (1862) 28 In. 388 (bill
YALE LAW JOURNAL
limited to legal tender, held instruments of the first class not bills or
notes, 22 but differed as to the second class. Some held that the expres-
sions in question, as a matter of construction, mean money; i. e., legal
tender, and do not, therefore, destroy the commercial character of the
instruments.2 3 Others held that they mean just what they say and the
instruments containing them are, in consequence, non-commercial.
2 4
of exchange to which that statute does not apply) ; Marc v. Kupfer (1864) 34
Ill. 286; Wood v. Price (1868) 46 Ill. 435; Tedfbrd v. Patton (1893) 144 Ill.
611, 33 N. E. 2229 (semble); Insurance Co. v. Allen (1863) 1I Mich. 501;
Phelps v. Town (i866) 14 Mich. 374; Black v. Ward (2873) 27 Mich. 191;
White v. Richmond (1847) 16 Oh. 5; Howe v. Hartness (i86o) ii Oh. St. 449
(and see Dugan v. Campbell (1823) 1 Oh. 115 and Citizens Bank v. Brown
(1887) 45 Oh. St. 39). Klauber v. Biggerstaff (1879) 47 Wis. 55, (overruling
Ford v. Mitchell (1862) 15 Wis. 334; Plait v. Sauk County Bank (1862) 17
Wis. 222; Lindsey v. McClelland (1864) 18 Wis. 481. Before the Civil War
the New York court took the view that currency is money. See its holdings on
instruments payable in bank notes cited in note 30, infra. Distinguish Leiber v.
Goodrich (1825, N. Y.) 5 Cowan, 186. In one case since it seems to have
adopted the legal tender definition. Frank v. Wessels (1876) 64 N. Y. 155.
Distinguish Ehle v. Chittenango Bank (1862) 24 N. Y. 548. Only in Ohio is
it clear that the cases under this group do not proceed on the theory that
currency at par is a necessary attribute of money. See particularly the holdings
on the related question as to the measure of recovery: Trowbridge v. Seaman
(1859) 21 Ill. 101; Chicago Insurance Co. v. Keiron (1862) 27 Ill. 5O1; Chicago
Bank v. Birney (1862) 28 Ili. 9o; Northern Bank v. Zepp (1862) 28 Ill. 28o;
Galena Insurance Co. v. Kupfer (1862) 28 Ill. 332; Chicago Bank v. Rushmore
(1862) 28 Ill. 463.
' But one case of an instrument expressly payable in what was not legal tender
being held non-commercial has been found: Lange v. Kohne (1821, S. C.) i
McCord, 115; see Gordon v. Parker (1844) io Miss. 485; but see Gift v. Hall
(184o, Tenn.) i Humph. 480.
"Cases of instruments in which the expressions used were construed to call
for legal tender with the result that such instruments were held commercial
are: Bull v. Bank of Kasson (1887) 123 U. S. io5, 8 Sup. Ct. 62 (not clear
that Court proceeded on legal tender theory, see opinion and earlier case of
Trebilcock v. Wilson (1871, U. S.) 12 Wall. 687); Lacy v. Halbrook (1842)
4 Ala. 88 (but see Mobile Bank v. Brown (1868) 42 Ala. io8); Milligen v.
Security Trust Co. (2928, Ind.) 118 N. E. 568 (overruling National Bank v.
Ringel); Kuhn v. National Bank (1918, Ind.) 229 N. E. 145; Hatch v. Dexter
Bank (1goo) 94 Me. 348, 47 Atl. 9o8 (probably based on this theory) ;Laird v.
State (1883) 61 Md. 3o9; Butler v. Paine (2863) 8 Minn. 324; Kirkwood v.
Hastings Bank (1894) 4o Neb. 484, 58 N. W. ioi6; Kirkwood v. Exchange
Bank (1894) 4o Neb. 497, 58 N. W. 1135; Prank v. Wessels (1876) 64 N. Y.
155; see New York cases cited in note 21, supra. The holder of such an
instrument could therefore recover its face value in specie. Burton v. Brooks
(1868) 25 Ark. 215; Graham v. Adams (843) 5 Ark. 261; Wilbur v. Greer
(2845) 6 Ark. 255; Lampton v. Haggard (1826, Ky.) 3 T. B. Mon. 149; McCord
v. Ford, supra, 166 (but see Bainbridge v. Owen (1829, Ky.) 2 J. J. Mar. 463 and
the Kentucky cases in note 24, infra); Gift v. Hall (284o, Tenn.) i Humph.
48o. See further: Fry v. Dudley (1868) 2o La. Ann. 368; Gordon v. Parker
(1844) 10 Miss. 485; Mitchell v. Hewitt (1845) r3 Miss. 361; Cockrill v. Kirk-
patrick (846) 9 Mo. 697; Ogden v. Slade (1846) 1 Tex. 13.
"'In the following cases the expressions were held not to call for legal tender
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Without examining the violence of construction often necessary to
reach the result attained by courts holding these expressions to mean
legal tender, there will be considered first the origin and then the
merits of the doctrine that money is confined to legal tender, which
doctrine it is that has driven these courts to such extremes in
construction.
The origin of the holding that "money" is limited to legal tender
is interesting and sheds considerable light upon the question as to the
present validity of the doctrine.
The beginning of this doctrine is Harrison's Case.2 5 An accountant
to the London Assurance Company added the digit 3 to a credit entry
in the company's bank book so that the entry read, "1777, June I6,
Bank Notes C. . 321o." He was indicted under 2 Geo. 2 ch. 25 and
31 Geo. 2 ch. 22, f. 78 for forging a receipt for money. The court
allowed the objection that bank bills were not money or goods within
the intent of these statutes since they were confined to money or
goods, while in 7 Geo. 2, bills, notes, etc. are particularly mentioned.
In Rex v. Wilcox,2 6 the prisoner was pardoned following a conviction
for forgery of a promissory note "to pay the bearer on demand one
guinea in cash or Bank of England Notes." No other report of this
case has been found. This one is most unsatisfactory. Both of these
being criminal cases and the penalty being death, they are a most
unsatisfactory basis for a rule in commercial law.2 7  But they were
so used in two English cases 28 in the early part of the 19th century
and the instruments were held not to be bills or notes: Mobile Bank v. Brown
(1868) 42 Ala. io8; National Bank v. Ringel (1875) 5, Ind. 393 (overruled and
see Drake v. Markle (1863) 21 Ind. 433 and cf. Krieg v. Palmer Bank (1911)
51 Ind. App. 34, 95 N. E. 613); Rindskoff v. Barett (186o) ii Iowa, 172;
Pilmer v. State Bank (1864) 16 Iowa, 321; Huse v. Hamblin (1870) 29 Iowa, 501
(but see Haddock v. Wood (1877) 46 Iowa, 433 and American Emigrant Co. v.
Clark (1878) 47 Iowa, 671 wherein the court found it necessary to relax its
rule by allowing it to be controlled by parol evidence and cf. Rindskoff v. Bareit
(1862) 14 Iowa, ioi); Johnson v. Henderson (1877) 76 N. C. 227 (but see
Johnson v. Miller (1877) 76 N. C. 439); Wright v. Hart (1863) 44 Pa. 454
(see comment on this case in Black v. Ward, supra); Loudon Society v.
Hagerstown Bank (i86o) 36 Pa. 498 (setble); Texas Land Co. v. Carroll
(1885) 63 Tex. 48 (cf. Wright v. Morgan (1896, Tex. Civ. App.) 37 S. W. 627
and McCormick v. Kampman (i9o8, Tex. Civ. App.) iog S* W. 492). Blood v.
Northrup (1862) I Kan. 28 is to be distinguished. Recovery by a holder of
such an instrument was, accordingly, limited to the face less depreciation.
Chambers v. George (1824, Ky.) 5 Litt. 335 (explained in McCord v. Ford);
Conwell v. Pumphrey (1857) 9 Ind. 135; Wharton v. Morris (1785, Pa.) i Dall.
124; Coffin v. Hill (1870, Tenn.) i Heisk. 385; Taylor v. Neblett 01871, Tenn.)
4 Heisk. 491; Williams v. Arnis (1867) 30 Tex. 37.
(1777)2 East, Pleas of the Crown (i8o6) 927.
-" (i8o8) Bayely, Bills (2d Am. ed. 1836) 1o.
"' See a like holding under anothe- criminal statute, Rex v. Hill (1811) Russ.
& R. i9o.
'Ex parte Imerson (I815, Eng. Bank.) 2 Rose B. C. 225; Ex pare Davidson
(1817) Buck B. C. 31.
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in the face of the fact that Bank of England notes were then con-
sidered as money in all ordinary business transactions though they
were not legal tender.2 0 None of these cases put the matter expressly
on the ground that absence of legal tenderability is the deciding feature.
In the United States the history of this subject prior to the Civil
War is largely a reflection of the parallel history of our monetary
system during this period. It is characterized principally by the
struggle between those fa*voring state banks with power of issue and
those favoring a federal bank or banks with like powers, which con-
test continued of uncertain event until the Civil War. Among other
ways, this dispute appeared in the cases in the question as to the status
of the circulating notes of state banks, one aspect of it being whether
an instrument payable in bank notes was commercial.
The cases on this.question scarcely admit of arrangement
° There
' Grigby v. Oakes (i8oi, Eng. C. P.) 2 Bos. & P. 526.
'Classifying the cases by jurisdictions, thosd holding instruments payable in
bank notes commercial are: Besanson v. Shirley (848) 17 Miss. 457 (statutory) ;
Keith v. Jones (1812, N. Y.) 9 Johns. 12o; Judah v. Harris (1821, N. Y.) ig
Johns. 144; Shetland v. Creigh (1846) i5 Oh. 118; This holding was limited
to bank notes that were current: Bonnell v. Covington (1843) 8 Miss. 322;
Little v. Phenix Bank (1842, N. Y.) 2 Hill, 425; Shamokin Bank v. Street (1864)
16 Oh. St. i. That the holder may recover the face at specie value was held
in Morris v. Edwards (1823) I Oh. x89 and Fleming v. Nail (1846) I Tex. 246.
Cases holding such instruments to be non-commercial are: Fry v. Rousseau
(1842, C. C. 7th) 3 McLean, lO6, Fed. Cas. No. 5141; Irvine v. Lowry (i84o,
U. S.) 14 Pet. 293; Carlisle v. Davis (1844) 7 Ala. 42 (but cf. Carter v. Penn
(842) 4 Ala. 14o); Hawkins v. Watkins (1843) 5 Ark. 481 ;Breckinridge v.
Rals (1827, Ky.) 4 T. B. Mon. 533 (and cf. Stucker v. Miller (1824, Ky.) 5 Litt.
235) ; Jones v. Fales (i8o8) 4 Mass. 245 (holding limited to non-current notes) ;
Far'well v. Kennett (1842) 7 Mo. 595; State v. Corpening (1849, N. C.) io Ired.
58; Warren v. Brown (i870) 64 N. C. 381 (and cf. Patton v. Hunt (i87o) 64
N. C. 163); McCormick v. Trotter (1823, Pa.) io Serg. and R. 94; Gray v.
Donahoe (1835, Pa.) 4 Watts 4oa; Gamble v. Hatton (Tenn.) Peck. 130;
Kirkpatrick v. McCullough (1842, Tenn.) 3 Humph. 171; Whileman v. Childress
(1845, Tenn.) 6 Humph. 3oi; Simpson v. Moulden (i866, Tenn.) 3 Coldw. 429
(cf. McDowell v. Keller (1867, Tenn.) 4 Colo. 258 and Childress v. Stuart (1823,
Tenn.) Peck. 276); Collins v. Lincoln (1839) I Vt. 268. In Wolfe v. Tyler
(i87o, Tenn.) i Heisk. 313, 316, it is said, "The principle . . . that a note
payable in current bank notes is not a note for money and, therefore, not
negotiable rests upon a highly technical distinction." In Butler v. Paine (1863)
8 Minn. 324 the cases are classified thus: Whenever the instrument was payable
within the state where litigated, the courts took judicial notice whether the
currency was at par. If so, the instrument was held good. Whenever the
instrument was payable in the currency of another state and without the state
where litigated, no such notice could be taken and the instrument was held non-
commercial. Jurisdictions holding an instrument payable in bank notes to be
non-commercial generally held that debt would not lie wherever and whenever
bank notes were seriously depreciated. Otherwise the holder could have
recovered a judgment for the face which could be satisfied only by the pay-
ment of specie. Jackson v. Waddill (1828, Ala.) i Stew. 579; Young v. Scott
(1843) 5 Ala. 475; Dillard v. Evans (1842) 4 Ark. 175; Mitchell v. Walker
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were conflicts of judicial opinion among the various' states and often
in the cases of a single state. Of the Kentucky cases, McBride, J.,
said in Cockrill v. Kirkpatrick:
"Whilst the banks in Kentucky redeemed their notes in gold and
silver, the expressions [payable in bank notes and the like] amounted
to nothing, they were imperative; but so soon as the banks suspended,
then the parties were presumed to contract for the irredeemable paper
currency of the State. Our bank, however, has not been forced into
a position so humiliating, and our courts have not yet been driven to
such extremities in endeavoring to satisfy the exigencies of the public
on the one hand, and a faithful discharge of their duty on the other.""1
Some of the factors operative to produce this confusion were:
varying inclinations on the political aspects of the question, different
degrees of depreciation from state to state, unlike statutory and admin-
istrative support given bank currency in the different states, and the
varying supply of other media of exchange in different areas. In
turn, all of these factors varied from decade to decade. Little wonder
that the decisions were quite as chaotic as was the nation's currency
during much of this period. The notion, long held, that only coin
could be made legal tender, under the constitution, confused the issue
considerably.
For the purpose in hand it is useful to recognize that these cases
are of doubtful value in determining the rule proper to be applied
to-day. The conditions then are not those of the present. True the
legal tender device was used little in the attempts to cure the evils of
an unsound currency. 2 Nor would its use have helped much, if any.
The basic difficulties were unregulated issue and uncertain redemption.
Since the Civil War the drift in the cases shows an increasing
recognition of the fact that the basic test of money of any kind is its
ability adequately to function as a medium of trade. The things caus-
ing this change of view have been the introduction of United States
legal tender notes and the parity of all of our currency. So long as
the rule applied is one based on unsound theory and is inflexible, as the
legal tender rule is, the inconvenience of a changing rule will not be
avoided.
Returning to the question as to the merits of limiting money to
legal tender, the rule ignores the history of bills and notes, is unsound
on principle and is inconvenient in practice.
(1842) 4 Ark. 145; Campbell v. Weister (1822, Ky.) i Litt. 30; Deberry v.
Darnell (i83O, Tenn.) 5 Yerg. 451; Hicklin v. Tucker (i83o, Tenn.) 2 Yerg.
448. And see Lackey v. Miller (i866) 6i N. C. 26; Hopson v. Fountain (844,
Tenn.) 5 Humph. 14o. Cf. Paup v. Drew (185o, U. S.) ig How. 218. Contra is
Searcy v. Vance (1827, Tenn.) Mart. & Y. 225. This rule did not necessarily
mean that the instrument was therefore not commercial, but this distinction
was one easily lost sight of.
"(1846) 9 Mo. 697, 72.
Paper currency was at times made legal tender to public creditors only.
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The law of commercial paper is but a part of the law merchant
"applied under its proper rules to the business of trade and com-
merce"33 which larger body of law is international in its origin. "These
rules are not conceived to be purely English law; they are, we may
say a ius gentium known to merchants throughout Christendom.1
3 4
True, under the heavy hands of many of the judges prior to Lord
Mansfield, the law merchant was provincialized to a lamentable degree,
but, by his research among its sources and by information got first
hand from merchants, he restored to this body of law much of its
ancient and convenient aspect of an international mercantile code.
Legal tender laws, on the other hand, are only national in their scope.
The law merchant in its growth and operation transcended national
boundaries and was as international as the trade it regulated and
facilitated.
The presence of the legal tender attribute of money ordinarily pre-
supposes a governmental monetary system. The contention that this
attribute of money is definitive must face the fact that, in the history
of trade, a public money system is of comparatively late origin while
the device of legal tender is a still more recent invention. At some
times and in some places, trade has existed without the former and
has flourished without the latter. While legal tender has proved very
useful,35 it is not, and never was, essential to trade. It has contributed
far less to the stability and consequent utility of money than has any
of the policies of regulated coinage and issue, strict standards of
fineness in coinage, and ample means for the redemption of paper
currency.
Why are bills and notes required to be payable in money? Admit-
tedly to increase their acceptability in the conduct of trade, to make
them useful devices of exchange. If the prospective transferee of
a bill or note can see that he will get out of it a universally adceptable
commodity, that is enough to effectuate the purpose of the require-
ment. He will get that if the instrument is payable in things that
pass current as money whether they do or do not happen to possess
the more or less artificial attribute of tenderability.
It is open to a layman to insist that things legal tender are not
always money for the purpose in hand because legal tender money
has often failed to pass current. There is no contention that it is open
to our courts of law to take this position. It is correct to say, as all
courts would, that, if an instrument is payable in legal tender, it is
clearly good.36 Courts are bound by legal tender laws and must accept
Hale, History of the Common Law (3d ed. 1739) 25.
I Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed. 1899) 467.
'Too often it has been used as a high-handed revenue measure to the
detriment of trade. Possibly the most startling example of this is the one from
China related by Marco Polo in describing the remarkable device by which
the Great Kaan got "more treasure than all the Kings of the World."
" Woodruff v. Mississippi (895) i6z U. S. 291, 16 Sup Ct. 82o.
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legal tender as an affirmative test, but there is no such necessity of
making it the negative test as well.
To say that nothing is money unless it is legal tender makes an
instrument payable in silver half-dollars non-commercial if it happens
to exceed ten dollars. Is the theory of bills and notes such that a
repeal of our legal tender laws would leave us without negotiable
instruments?
The narrower definition of money is inconvenient in practice. When,
as now, the greater part of our circulating medium is not legal tender,
it is a hardship to prohibit business men, at the peril of having their
paper declared non-commercial, to make their paper payable in what
they and everybody else are perfectly willing, and practically com-
pelled, to take as money. Are banks to be unable to protect themselves
by making their paper payable in current funds if the whole business
community be willing that they should? Our present money policy
and our whole national financial structure are predominantly founded
upon the fact of currency rather than tenderability. The law of bills
and notes should square itself to this policy.
The broader definition of money contended for here does not involve
the result that a bill or note payable in negotiable bills or notes would
be a commercial instrument. 37  It is true that negotiable bills and
notes serve as media of exchange in a broad sense. But the dividing
line is to be drawn where convenience dictates. The distinction is a
practical one and is quite obvious. Thus a bank note is not a mere
chose in action and may, accordingly, be levied on by an execution.
Other examples are to be found in the foot note.38 Lord Mansfield's
statement of this distinction, made in another connection, is scarcely
to be improved:
"But the whole fallacy of the argument turns upon comparing bank-
notes to what they do not resemble, and what they ought not to be
compared to, viz. to goods, or to securities, or documents for debts.
Now they are not goods, not securities, nor documents for debts, nor
are so esteemed: but are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary
course and transaction of business, by the general consent of mankind;
which gives them the credit and currency of money, to all intents and
purposes. They are as much money, as guineas themselves are; or
any other current coin, that is used in common payments, as money
'That they are not: Hasbrook v. Palmer (1839, C. C.'7th) 2 McLean, io,
Fed. Cas. No. 6188; The Lykus (1888, S. D. N. Y.) 36 Fed. gig; January v.
Henry (1825, Ky.) 3 T. B. Mon. 8; First National Bank v. Slette (1897) 67
Minn. 425, 69 N. W. 1148; Chandler v. Calvert (igoi) 87 Mo. App. 368; Ham-
burg Bank v. Johnson (1846, S. C.) 3 Rich. 42; First National Bank v. Green-
ville Bank (1892) 84 Tex. 40, 19 S. W. 334.
"Handy v. Dobbin (z815, N. Y.) 12 Johns. 219 and see further Pohlman v.
Pohlman (1912) 15o Ky. 679, 150 S. W. 829; Anderson Carriage Co. v. Bartley
(1907) lo2 Me. 492, 67 At. 567; Michigan Cent. Ry. v. Harsha (19o4, C. C. A.
6th) 134 Fed. 217, 221; State v. Mispagle (1907) 207 Mo. 557, io6 S. W. 513.
Cf. Johnson v. Tabor (1911) IoI Miss. 78, 57 So. 365.
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or cash. They . . . are never considered as securities for money,
but as money itself. . .. On payment of them, Whenever a receipt
is required, the receipts are always given as for money, not as for
securities."8 19
The rule contended for that anything passing current as cash is
money, does not, accordingly, include negotiable bills and notes'
0
Within the category, money. Further qualification is necessary. A
particular thing may serve as a medium of exchange, passing current,
as cash, in such a limited area or for so short a time that it should
not be denominated money for the purposes of bills and notes.4" But
anything which for a substantial period of time and throughout any
important commercial community is, by general consent, used and
treated n common payments as cash in the ordinary course and trans-
action of business is money.
Some light upon this question is to be had from the legal definition.
of money for some of the purposes other than that of bills and notes.
In Moss v. Hancock42 it was held that the original owner of a rare
£E5 gold piece that had been stolen could recover it, though it had been
purchased innocently by a dealer in curiosities. The coin had not
ceased to be legal tender. But it had been removed from the channels
of trade, i. e., had ceased to be current and was taken by the dealer
not as a representative of its nominal vale but as a thing possessing
only intrinsic value. In the case of Miller v. Race already quoted
from, Lord Mansfield, treating a like question, said:
"The true-reason [why money cannot be followed into the hands
of an innocent taker for value] is, upon account of the currency of
it:- it can not be recovered after it has passed in currency . . . but
before money has passed in currency, an action may be brought for
the money itself. . . . It-never- shall be followed into the hands of
a person who bona fide took it in the course of currency and in the
way of his business. . . . A bank-niote is constantly and universally,
both at home and abroad, treated as' money, as cash; and paid and
received as cash; and it is necessary, for the purposes of commerce,
that their currency should be established and secured."' 3
A bequest of "moneys" covers not only coin but bank notes and
other currency.- It does not cover notes, bonds, mortgages and other
securities.
4'
"Miller v. Race (1758, K. B.) r Burrow, 452, 457.
Nor does it exclude instruments such as national bank notes. They are
promissory notes but they are also something more They are currency, cash
or money within Lord Mansfield's description.
" See Chapman v. Cole (1858, Mass.) 12 Gray, 14r. An interesting account of
the currency of the Isle of Man, which is in point, is found in Chitty, op. cit.,
86, note 8. Here fall gold dust, pelts, and the like.
2(1899) 2 Q. B. 3.
" Miller v. Race, supra, 457-9. Brown v. Perea (1918) 176 N. Y. Supp. 215
is an important case in this connection.
"Mann v. Mann (1814, N. Y.) i Johns, Ch. 231; Pohlan v. Pohlman, supra.
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The strictness with which criminal statutes and indictments are
construed does not prevent larceny or embezzlement of "money"
covering both what is legal tender and what is current.45 To have held
otherwise when the penalty was death would be understandable but
to-day it would not be good sense to make the result hinge on whether
the accused happened to take a Silver Certificate or a United States
note.
The authority of an agent to collect money extends to de facto as
well as de jure money, but it does not include bills, checks, notes and
the like.
48
The power of the federal government to coin money and to borrow
money on the credit of the United States is not limited to the coining
and borrowing of legal tender.
There are a great many other situations where the word, money,
has been given the broader definition 47 and where the reasons for so
doing are not so important as those in the case of commercial paper.
INSTRUMENTS PAYABLE IN FOREIGN MONEY
Before taking up the effect of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
there remains to be considered under this head the effect of making
an instrument payable in foreign money. To clear the ground for
discussing this question it is necessary to distinguish some collateral
matter.
The present question does not arise if foreign money is used merely
to designate the amount of value to be handed over in making pay-
ments provided the thing designated to be handed over is domestic
money of the place of payment.48 Apart from possible uncertainty
of amount, which is not considered here, an instrument so drawn is a
bill or note. For the purpose in hand, an instrument reading, "I
promise to pay in New York to P or order the value of one barrel of
whiskey in the gold coin of the United States," is a promissory note
just as it would be if, "one hundred pound sterling," were substituted
for, "one barrel of whiskey." Nor does the question arise if the
instrument expresses the sum to be paid in terms of the money of a
foreign country and is silent as to the medium of payments. The fair
meaning probably is that the instrument calls for money of the
country where it is payable. Such an instrument is commercial. 49
"Johnson v. State (igio) 167 Ala. 82, 52 So. 652; State v. Finnegean (go5)
x27 Iowa, 286, 1O3 N. W. 155; State v. Quackenbush (19o6) 98 Minn. 515, Io8
N. W. 953; cf. Block v. State (1876) 44 Tex. 62o. See Territory v. Hale (i9o5)
i3 N. Mex. i81; Hunt v. State (79o4) 72 Ark. 241, 79 S. W. 769.
'Mechem, Agency (2d ed.. I9o3) 946.
'727 Cyc. 817-822. See Cary v. Courteney (1869) 1o3 Mass. 316.
"Norton, op. cit., 67. See also Hebblethwaite v. Flint (1918) 185 App. Div.
249, 173 N. Y. Supp. 581.
'King v. Hamilton (882, C. C. Ore.) 12 Fed. 478; Black v. Ward (x873) 27
Mich. i91; Hogue v. Williamson (1893) 85 Tex. 553, 22 S. W. 58o; see Thomp-
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Although the designated medium of payment is money foreign to
the place of payment, the commercial status of the instrument should
not be held to be affected. 50  If the foreign money is current at the
place of payment, as for example, United States money in parts
of Mexico and Canada, the instrument should be held to be payable in
money upon considerations already enumerated and for the reasons
which follow. If the foreign money is not current in the place of
payment, two positions are possible: (a) Such foreign money may
be considered an ordinary commodity with the result that an instru-
ment payable therein is non-commercial; (b) if the foreign money in
question is that of one of the recognized nations of the world engaged
in international trade, such money is a device of international trade
and its status as such should be recognized 51 with the result that an
instrument payable therein is a commercial instrument. The first
position is parochial and involves a failure to appreciate not only
the international character of commercial law but also the growing
needs of foreign trade.
Mr. Justice Field said:
"Undoubtedly it is the law that, to be negotiable, a bill, promissory
note or check must be payable in money, or whatever is current as
such by the law of the country where the instrument is drawn or
payable."
52
In Story on Bills it is said,
"the Bill should be for the payment of money. . . . But, if it be
payable in money, it is of no consequence in the currency or money
of what country it is payable.
' 53
son v. Sloan (I84o, N. Y.) 23 Wend. 71, per Cowan, J. Related questions not
considered arise when the country of issue and the country of payment have
money systems of identical denominations, but of different values. If the
instrument is silent as to which is to be considered in fixing the amount to be
paid, which is controlling? If there is inserted in the instrument, "payable in
the money of the United States", does that stipulation relate to the amount to
be paid, or to the medium of payment or to both?
' That such are commercial instruments: St. Stephen Branch Ry. v. Black
(i87o, New Brunswick) 2 -ann. 139. Dicta to this effect are found in Sanger
v. Stimpson (181i) 8 Mass. 26o; Black v. Ward, supra; Brown v. Perera
(1918) 176 N. Y. Supp. 215; Hogue v. Williamson, supra; Third National Bank
v. Crosby (1878) 43 U. C. Q. B. 58. Contra: Thompson v. Sloan (184o, N. Y.)
23 Wend. 71; Bettis v. Waller (I87o) 3o U. C. R. 23 (in terms overruled in
Third National Bank v. Crosby). Cf. Jones v. Fales (i8o8) 4 Mass. 245 and
Young v. Adams (18io) 6 Mass. 182.
"1 The reasons for this po sition cannot be better stated than they are in Brown
v. Perera, supra. The opinion of Leventritt, referee in the court below, is
most excellent and shows a degree of understanding of the whole background
of commercial law rarely to be found in the books since Lord Mansfield's time.
Cf. Chapman v. Cole (1858, Mass.) 12 Gray, 141.
' Bull v. Bank of Kasson, supra, i32.
' Story, Bills of Exchange (2d ed. 1847) sec. 43. It has been suggested
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Chitty seems to go even farther when he says:
"But it is said, that it is not necessary that the money should be
that current in the place of payment, or where the bill is drawn; it
may be in money of any country whatever."' 4
It is worthy of note that the Uniform Law adopted at the Hague
provides in article 4o that the parties may expressly stipulate that the
holder may demand payment in a specified foreign currency. Before
rashly striking down all such instruments it might be prudent at least to
inquire whether there is a distinction between an instrument drawn
in New York and payable in New York in a medium of payment
foreign to that place and an instrument drawn in London and payable
in New York in a medium of payment which is money in London
but not in New York. It would not be surprising to find that when
the merchants of the Mediterranean city-states drew on 'the Lombards
in London they not infrequently designated their own money as the
medium of payment.
EFFECT OF THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
The Negotiable Instruments Law does not touch the question
whether instruments specifying foreign money as the payment medium
are negotiable.
Under it, may a negotiable instrument be payable in de facto money
as well as in legal tender? The act is ambiguous. Section I pro-
vides, "An instrument to be negotiable must contain an unconditional
promise or order to pay a sum certain in money." By section 132
an acceptance "must not express that the drawee will perform his
promise by any other means than the payment of money." In neither
of these provisions is there a definition of "money." Section 6 pro-
vides," "The validity and negotiable character of an instrument are
not affected by the fact that it . . designates a particular kind
of current money in which payment is to be made."55 The main pur-
(Russel, op. cit., 55; Norton, op. cit., 62) that Story was here speaking of the
designation of the amount to be paid as opposed to the medium of payment.
But Story was aware of this distinction and he entertained no such localized
notions of commercial law as is shown, by the authorities cited. He adds in
secs. 44, 45, "The same rule prevails in both respects, in the French law.
Pardessus has well observed, that . . . the nature and kind of money should
be specified, when the payment is to be made in any other money than that of
the place of payment. . . . Heineccius has added, that not only the sum of
money should be expressed in the Bill, but also the kind of money, otherwise
it will be taken to be the common currency of the country on which it is
drawn." With Teidman, Commercial Paper (i889) sec. 29b, compare Teidman,
Bills & Notes (I898) sec. 22.
" Chitty, Bills of Exchange (iith Am. ed. 1849) *133.
The corresponding provision of the act as adopted in Illinois is "is payable
in currency or current funds or designates."
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pose of this provision seems to be to codify the common-law rule as
to deferred payments." A definition of money is not the primary
intent of this provision. If this be considered a definition of money
by implication, and that is quite arguable, it adds confusion, if any-
thing, for there is used,. not the term currency or money, but the more
uncertain combination, current money. Then again in section 125,
defining material alteration, there appears, " . . . which changes
. . the medium or currency in which payment is to be made."
Only three cases involving this question have been deeided under
the act.57 The Supreme Court of Iowa has held5s that a check pay-
able "in current funds". is not negotiable, following the previous
holding in that state.5 9 There was no reference to the act. It has
been held otherwise in Forest v. Trust Company" as to a certificate
of deposit with the, same provision, this point not being discussed but
the act being mentioned. In New York an agreement to pay "$2340
currency" has been held negotiable under the Negotiable Instruments
Law.61
Though an amendment to the act may be necessary to secure a
uniform rule that "money" for the purposes of the law of bills and
notes is not limited to legal tender,
2 it is arguable that the act is
sufficiently ambiguous to permit, in view of the paramount purpose to
secure uniformity,63 the abandoning of the legal tender definition and
the consequent working out of a proper and uniform result under
the act. What is more likely to happen first is that there will be an
increasing number of courts, regardless of the act, revising their con-
struction of the terms "currency," "current funds," etc., and holding
them to be equivalent to legal tender, as the Supreme Court of Indiana
has done recently.6" This, however, would not save an instrument
expressly payable in gold or silver certificates, national bank notes
See infra.
"Burritt v. Lunny (1916) go Conn. 491, 97 Atl. 756, merely holds that a tender
of de facto money is a valid tender if not objected to on the ground that the
money tendered is not legal tender.
"Dille v. White (19o6) 132 Iowa, 327, 1o9 N. W. gog.
"Huse v. Hamblin (1870) 29 Iowa, 5oi and cases in note 24, supra.
I (igo, C. C. E. D. Pa.) 174 Fed. 345. This case follows the prior rule in the
federal courts. Bull v. Bank of Casson, supra.
'Merchants National Bank v. Sanita Maria Sugar Co. (1914) 162 App. Div.
248, 147 N. Y. Supp. 498. This is in accord with the New York law prior to the
act. Frank v. Wessels (876) 64 N. Y. 155.
'Professor Brannon suggests in (913) 26 H.Av. L. REv., 493, an amendment
for this purpose. The amendment suggested does not include instruments pay-
able in foreign money unless such money is lawfully and actually circulating
at par with legal tender at the time and place of payment. All such instruments
should be included. The word "lawfully" as here used is ambiguous, and it
should not be forgotten that some circulating media not legal tender have passed
at a premium and may do so again.
IFor cases on this see Brannon, Negotiable Instruments Law (2d ed. 19II) I.
"Millikan v. Security Trust Co. (1918, Ind.) 118 N. E. 556.
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or Federal Reserve notes which constitute by far the greater part of
the money in actual use. They are all lawfully circulating. It is
desirable that the law should conform to the national monetary policy
which they represent. But what is more serious, dealing with the
matter by construction rather than. by abandonment of the notion
that legal tender is definitive of money results in business men being
unable to make instruments negotiable and at the same time to protect
themselves against demand for payment in the kinds of money that
are but a fraction of the available currency of the nation.
SPECIFYING A PARTICULAR KIND OF MONEY
Granted that the thing in which the instrument is payable is money,
such an instrument does not lose its commercial character if it specifies
a particular kind of money in which payment is to be made.65 This
rule is codified in section 6 subdivision 5 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law.6 The business background out of which this rule emerges is
that, while over relative long periods of time the purchasing power
of all kinds of money (however money may be defined) varies, in
addition to this variation, the value of some kinds of money in rela-
tion to other kinds sometimes fluctuates. For the repayment of his
debt a man advancing credit may naturally desire to choose a par-
ticular kind of money which he thinks likely to undergo a minimum of
variation in value of the second sort so that, to this extent, at least,
he may guard against receiving in return less value than he has
advanced. And the debtor, too, may desire, as far as possible to
guard against his having to return a greater value than he has received.
A rule of law making this possible facilitates long time credit trans-
actions particdlarly and involves an interest which the law should and
does sanction. 7 But obviously the reasons back of this rule are not
"Chrysler v. Renois (187o) 43 N. Y. 2o9, seems to be the only case in which
the question is alluded to by the court. There are many cases which treat such
instrument as commercial, the point not being considered, e. g., Trebilcock v.
Wilson, supra; Wood v. Bullen (1863, Mass.) 6 Allen 516; Phillips v. Dugan
(1871) 21 Oh. St. 466; Sntiith v. McKinley (1871) 22 Oh. St. 2o; Hogue v.
Williamson, supra; Strickland v. Holbrooke (1888) 75 Calif. 642; Churchman
v. Martin (1877, Ind.) 4 CF=T. L. J. 343. In point would be cases involving
instruments payable in paper currency in jurisdictions holding money to mean
de facto money. Cf. Frank v. Wessel, supra; Kelley v. Ferguson (1873, N. Y.)
46 How. Prac. 411. An instrument payable in United States gold coin is a note
within section 3088 of the Calif. Civ. Code. Eastman v. Sunset Park Land Co.
(1917) 35 Calif. App. 628, I7O Pac. 642. An entirely separate question, con-
sidered in note 67, infra, is whether the law gives effect to such stipulations.
'No case under the statute has been found. Few, if any, questions concern-
ing this provision are likely to arise.
The leading case on this question is Bronson v. Rodes (1868, U. S.) 7 Wall.
229. Other cases are collected in 6 Rose's Notes (Rev. ed.) 583-587. Prior
to Bronson v. Rodes there was a division in judicial opinion on the question as
to the enforcibility.of contracts to make payment in gold or silver. 29 L. R. A.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
based upon any notion that the attribute of being legal tender is the
distinguishing characteristic of money at all times and places and
for all purposes. Here the attribute in the foreground is its aspect
as a standard of value for deferred payments. The law recognizes
this social utility which money has and, recognizing, too, that it does
not perform this function perfectly, sanctions this corrective device.
If financial history showed that the kinds of money 6ommonly given
by law the attribute of legal tender typically were least subject to
the variation in value in question, the cases involving the rule here
discussed would lend support to the view that, for the purposes of
bills and notes, money means legal tender. But such is not the fact
of experience.8 8 The most obvious and frequent means adopted by
legislators to check the declining value of a particular kind of money
has been to attempt to compel. acceptance of it by making it legal
tender.
But more may be said. If the purpose is the standardization of
deferred payments and the choice of means for so doing is limited to
defining money either as that which is legal tender or as that which
is in fact current, the kinds of money, which in the long run are
likely to be subject to the least change in future value will, in the
main, be as nearly identical with those which are generally acceptable-
i. e., which pass current now-as with the kinds which may happen
to be legal tender.
If there are considered only the business situations giving rise to
the rule that a bill or note may be made payable in a particular kind
of money, it would be desirable to define money so as to limit it to
the kinds the values of which are least likely to change in relation to
the values of other kinds. But another interest must be considered,
viz., that there shall be admitted to the category of commercial paper
all instruments payable in a medium approximating universal accepta-
bility. If, in rare cases, the two conflict, the former should give way
because of their relative commercial importance and of the sufficiency
of the present rule to take care of the occasional cases of conflict.
512, note collecting cases. See Echols v. Grattan (1871) 42 Ga. 547, and Caldwell
v. Craig (1872, Va.) 22 Gratt. 340, on the difficulties of construction often found
in cases of this kind. The opinion of Chief Justice Chase in Bronson v. Rodes
is instructive especially when compared with such reasoning as was found in
cases like Wood v. Bullen, supra.
United States v. American Gold Coin (1868) Fed. Cas., No. 14,439; For
other examples see the financial history reflected in the cases collected in 29
L. R. A. 512 note, and in Dorrance v. Stewart (794, Pa.) i Yeates, 349.
